The recent capture and reported extradition of IS-K terrorist Mohammad Sharifullah to the United States have raised pressing questions about Pakistan’s role in global terrorism. While the U.S. and Pakistani governments portray this development as a major counterterrorism victory, a deeper examination suggests a recurring pattern: the Pakistani military’s strategic use of extremist elements as bargaining chips for diplomatic and financial leverage.
Sharifullah: A Convenient Pawn in a Larger Game
Muhammad Sharifullah also known as Jaffer, from a low level ISIS-K (ISKP operative to an accidental leader
Michael Kugelman, a noted South Asian affairs analyst, described Sharifullah as a “big fish” following reports of his extradition. However, the timing of his capture and transfer to U.S. authorities hints at a more calculated move by Pakistan’s military establishment. Historically, the Pakistani military has “farmed” terrorists—allowing them to operate until their strategic value peaks, at which point they are handed over in exchange for international rewards.
A parallel can be drawn to the case of Osama bin Laden, who was mysteriously discovered in Abbottabad, Pakistan, when then-U.S. President Barack Obama needed a major political victory ahead of his 2012 re-election campaign. Similarly, the Sharifullah handover comes at a time when former President Donald Trump is seeking to bolster his image as a tough-on-terror leader, particularly as he balances a delicate diplomatic approach toward Russia.
The True Role of Sharifullah in IS-K’s Operations
While the U.S. and Pakistani intelligence agencies claim that Sharifullah masterminded the 2021 Kabul Abbey Gate bombing and was involved in the recent Moscow concert attack, independent reports paint a different picture. According to intelligence sources cited by Al-Mirsad, Sharifullah was primarily a reconnaissance operative for IS-K, not the mastermind behind the Kabul attack.
Captured in 2019 by Afghan authorities, Sharifullah escaped during the mass prison breaks following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. After the Taliban systematically dismantled IS-K leadership in 2022 and 2023, Sharifullah found himself unexpectedly elevated within the terrorist organization due to a leadership vacuum. Yet, even then, his role was limited to managing surveillance operations rather than orchestrating large-scale attacks.
The Real Architects of the Kabul Attack
In contrast, two confirmed IS-K leaders were responsible for the Kabul airport bombing:
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Abdullah Kabuli, who managed IS-K’s migration office, was killed in a Taliban operation in Nimroz on April 9, 2023.
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Dr. Hussain, a member of IS-K’s central Shura and head of the group’s “martyrdom brigades,” was eliminated in Herat on April 5, 2023.
Both individuals had far more direct involvement in the attack than Sharifullah. Yet, the Trump administration and Pakistani authorities have exaggerated Sharifullah’s role, presenting him as the primary mastermind.
Pakistan’s Agenda: Selling Terrorists for Political Gain
The Pakistani military’s history of strategically “selling” captured terrorists for diplomatic favours is well-documented.
Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Asim Munir and Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (DGISI) Asim Malik had been eager to secure an invitation to the U.S. before Trump’s return to office. However, they had to settle for sending Mohsin Naqvi, the current interior minister—an unelected relative of the Army Chief—who was appointed after alleged election rigging in February 2024, a fact condemned by both the UK and U.S. governments. His visit as an emissary was not well received at that time.
The Pakistani military regime used the IS-K threat as leverage, arguing that they could combat IS-K—despite reports that IS-K factions were now operating from safe havens inside Pakistan under ISI supervision.
Following its forced withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Pakistani military has repositioned IS-K as a potential counterbalance to the Taliban. While it initially deployed these militants to undermine Taliban rule, Pakistan is now repackaging them as an imminent global threat to persuade the U.S. to maintain military and financial ties.
However, Trump’s re-election strategy complicates this narrative. Unlike his first term, where he sought to disengage from prolonged wars, Trump’s current rhetoric emphasizes strength and decisiveness. Thus, Pakistan’s military elite is playing both sides—pitching itself as an indispensable counterterrorism ally while simultaneously enabling the very threats it claims to combat.
Conclusion: The Endless Cycle of Manufactured Threats
The capture and extradition of Sharifullah exemplify the Pakistani military’s long-standing playbook: cultivate extremists, use them for regional influence, then sell them to the West when politically expedient. This tactic has repeatedly secured financial aid, weapons deals, and diplomatic backing for Pakistan, even as its role in sustaining global terrorism remains evident.
With the Trump administration eager to display counterterrorism victories, Sharifullah’s case serves as a timely distraction—one that allows Pakistan’s military to maintain its status as both an enabler of and a supposed solution to terrorism. The real question remains: how long will the world continue to fall for this game?
