The recently introduced Mines and Minerals Act in Pakistan has triggered widespread alarm for its implications not just on governance and resource management, but on the creeping authoritarianism led by the country’s military establishment. Although cloaked in promises of investment facilitation and transparency, a closer look reveals how the federal government—working under the shadow of military control—is using legislative tools to centralize power, undermine provincial autonomy, and secure control over Pakistan’s lucrative strategic and rare earth minerals.
Centralization Behind a Civilian Facade
At first glance, the Mines and Minerals Act appears to be a comprehensive legal framework to regulate the exploration, licensing, and development of mineral resources. It includes the creation of authorities, licensing processes, cadastre systems, and appellate tribunals. However, the act’s deeper layers expose how the military-dominated federal regime is bypassing provincial rights under the pretext of administrative efficiency.
Although the Act does not name the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) explicitly, its structure and control mechanisms mirror the military-controlled body’s modus operandi. The inclusion of federal oversight bodies, particularly the Federal Mineral Wing and Mineral Investment Facilitation Authority, in defining the terms for strategic and rare earth minerals hints at a power grab orchestrated by the military through civilian proxies.
Strategic and Rare Earth Minerals: Who Really Owns Them?
One of the most controversial aspects of the act lies in Section 76, which deals with the discovery of strategic and rare earth minerals. It mandates:
- Immediate reporting to federal authorities upon discovery.
- Suspension of all activity in the vicinity until further authorization.
- No rights granted to the original discoverer unless a fresh license is approved.
The implications are clear: all critical mineral discoveries are subject to federal discretion, effectively stripping provinces of the right to exploit or even participate in managing their own resources. The Federal Mineral Wing—a military-influenced department—retains the power to declare which minerals are ‘strategic,’ with no criteria defined, leaving the door wide open for arbitrary classification and appropriation.
The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Case: Disempowerment by Design
In KPK, where the PTI-led provincial government was elected by a public mandate, the Mines and Minerals Act has been introduced without genuine consultation. With Imran Khan behind bars and PTI politically neutralized, the military-backed federal government is using legal instruments to enforce its will, neutralizing local opposition and transferring provincial powers to Islamabad-based bureaucrats and military proxies.
Balochistan: Resource-Rich but Powerless
In Balochistan, where strategic minerals like copper, gold, and rare earths are abundant, the situation is even graver. The act empowers the federal government to seize any licensed area in the name of national interest (Section 34), and even take possession of works and equipment during emergencies. Given the historical disenfranchisement of Baloch people and the military’s economic interests in the province, this clause reinforces the colonial-style extraction mindset.
The so-called “compensation mechanisms” are vague and tied to government discretion, providing no real protection for local investors or communities. Meanwhile, the act grants blanket immunity to all federal and departmental officials, including military-linked authorities, insulating them from legal consequences.
Impunity and Unchecked Authority
The act’s sweeping indemnity provisions (Section: “Immunity of Authorities”) mean no official can be held accountable for decisions made “in good faith.” This clause essentially greenlights unchecked interference by federal—and by extension, military—authorities in resource allocation, licensing, and land seizures.
Section 34.4 goes even further by allowing the government to take over private mining operations in times of war or national emergency, a clause disturbingly vague in its trigger points and prone to abuse, especially under Pakistan’s ever-expanding “security state” narrative.
The Federal-Military Nexus: Investment or Exploitation?
While the government markets this law as an “investment-friendly” reform, the real benefactors appear to be military-linked business enterprises. Given the army’s stakes in dozens of commercial ventures—including mining companies and construction conglomerates—the act raises ethical and constitutional questions about conflicts of interest, dual roles, and the erosion of civilian supremacy.
The Mineral Investment Facilitation Authority—stacked with federal and military-friendly bureaucrats—has sweeping powers to recommend policy, fast-track decisions, and set national agendas for mining. This not only disempowers provincial legislators but also undermines Pakistan’s federal structure, especially when such decisions directly affect provincial lands and livelihoods.
Conclusion: Exploitation Masquerading as Reform
Pakistan’s Mines and Minerals Act is a textbook example of federal overreach disguised as policy reform. Behind its technical jargon and legalese lies a strategic effort by the military-dominated federal apparatus to centralize control over Pakistan’s most valuable natural assets—its strategic and rare earth minerals.
The act’s bypassing of provincial consultation, vague emergency provisions, denial of local rights to discovered minerals, and legal immunity for authorities create a toxic legal framework that prioritizes state power over democratic process and public interest.
If Pakistan genuinely seeks a future built on inclusive economic development, the Mines and Minerals Act must be rewritten with provincial input, civilian oversight, and public accountability at its core. Otherwise, this legislation will only deepen the country’s internal divisions and prolong its democratic crisis.
