The Pakistani military’s top brass and its backed politicians’ vision of a “Greater Punjab” is not centered on reunification with India but rather on the establishment of soft borders that promote economic integration, modeled after the Kartarpur Corridor. This approach, heavily influenced by the India-backed Sharif Crime Clan, seeks to facilitate free trade and cross-border movement, aiming to boost economic ties between the two Punjabs. However, such a model presents significant challenges for Pakistan, particularly in the face of India’s dominant market economy and Islamabad’s already fragile financial state.
Economic Dependence and Market Competition
The proposal for soft borders and increased trade between Punjab, Sindh (including Karachi), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) along the Grand Trunk (GT) Road, and India is framed as an economic opportunity. However, Pakistan risks becoming an economic satellite of India, given the stark asymmetry between the two economies. India’s $3.7 trillion economy, with its industrial base and established global trade networks, dwarfs Pakistan’s struggling economy, which is plagued by chronic deficits, IMF bailouts, and institutional corruption.
By opening up trade through the Punjab corridor, Pakistani businesses would find themselves unable to compete with India’s highly industrialized and efficient production sectors. This could lead to deindustrialization in Pakistan, similar to what has been observed in some smaller economies that engage in free trade with larger, more competitive neighbors. While the elite beneficiaries of this policy—many of whom have vested interests in cross-border business—may profit, Pakistan’s local industry, agriculture, and workforce stand to suffer.
The Marginalization of Balochistan and Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
The concept of “Greater Punjab” is inherently exclusionary, sidelining regions that do not fit into the Punjab-centric economic model. Balochistan and southern KP are not included in this vision, as their strategic and economic interests do not align with the plan. Instead, these areas are caught in a different geopolitical struggle, where China, the U.S., and Iran play significant roles.
Unlike Punjab, Sindh, and GT Road-based KP, which are economically integrated with Punjab, Balochistan and southern KP are considered liabilities under this model. Their instability and insurgencies pose security and economic risks that contradict the investment and trade-driven narrative of “Greater Punjab.” Consequently, the Pakistani establishment appears mentally prepared to detach these regions from its long-term economic plans if necessary.
India’s Strategic Calculations and the Balochistan Factor
India’s long-term security strategy does not align with an unstable western border. The rise of China in Balochistan—through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—and the region’s proximity to Iran make it a potential flashpoint in the growing U.S.-China competition. Given these factors, India cannot afford to engage in a two-front conflict, nor can it risk regional instability spilling over into its borders.
For India, a controlled, economically dependent Pakistan—rather than a fragmented one—is strategically preferable. While India may endorse economic integration with Punjab, it is unlikely to support a complete breakdown of Pakistan’s territorial cohesion. However, if the Sharif Clan’s “Greater Punjab” project is to gain acceptance in New Delhi, it would necessitate the exclusion of volatile regions like Balochistan and southern KP, which together comprise more than half of Pakistan’s landmass.
From the current trajectory, it appears that Pakistan’s Punjab-centric military and political establishment has mentally prepared itself for such an outcome. By prioritizing economic integration with India and sidelining Balochistan and southern KP, Pakistan’s ruling elite seem willing to reshape the country’s internal dynamics in favor of a “Greater Punjab” framework.
Balochistan: A Lost Cause?
A serving Lieutenant General of the Pakistan Army, speaking to the scribe on condition of anonymity, stated that the military has already lost control of Balochistan—Pakistan’s 44% landmass. He added that no matter how many counterinsurgency operations are launched, the situation is unlikely to change due to the region’s complex terrain and great power rivalry, where insurgents receive international support.
Under these circumstances, Greater Punjab, with Karachi—Sindh’s economic hub—fully incorporated into the plan, has become the preferred investment destination for wealthy military officers. The economic elite within the military see Punjab, Karachi, and the GT Road belt of KP as the only viable regions for long-term financial security, further solidifying the economic divide between Punjab and the marginalized regions.
Conclusion
The Pakistani military’s “Greater Punjab” strategy, facilitated by the Sharif-led regime, is a risky economic gamble that could lead to Pakistan’s economic subjugation to India. While soft borders and free trade may seem beneficial in the short term, the long-term implications include a weakened industrial base, growing economic dependence, and deeper internal divisions within Pakistan.
Additionally, Balochistan and southern KP remain outside this vision, as they are increasingly shaped by great power rivalries rather than regional economic integration. India, despite its interest in economic engagement, will continue to prioritize border stability and containment of Chinese influence in Balochistan over any rapid normalization with Pakistan.
In essence, the “Greater Punjab” project is not a unifying force for Pakistan—it is a policy designed to benefit a select elite while exposing the country to severe economic, political, and geopolitical vulnerabilities.
