In today’s volatile South Asia, the greatest threat to regional stability may not come from rogue militants or foreign interventions, but from a self-appointed “monarch” in military fatigues. Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir has engineered a dangerous paradox: manufacturing terror to market counterterrorism services to the world, while sustaining a decades-old military-industrial complex built on jihadist proxies. It’s a strategy that simultaneously plays arsonist and firefighter—a dual role with devastating regional consequences.
Asim Munir and his enablers in a picture taken at the Headquarters of the ISI in Islamabad, days before the Pahalgam Terrorist Attack, which facilitated the rise of Asim Munir to the rank of a Field Marshal
From Proxy Patron to Peacemaker?
General Munir’s ascent marks not just a continuation but an intensification of Pakistan’s long-standing strategy of using militant proxies as instruments of state policy. This time, however, the stakes are higher, and the ambitions grander. Recent intelligence reports and regional analyses indicate that Munir has greenlit a fresh wave of militant infiltration into Indian-administered Kashmir. These operations are reportedly coordinated by ISI’s Special Operations Division, headed by the handpicked General from Lahore, named Shahab Aslam, from the 87th PMA long course.
Munir appears determined to extend his rule by two decades—de facto if not de jure—through perpetual regional instability. Kashmir, with its deep-rooted emotional and geopolitical weight, serves as the perfect flashpoint. By reigniting conflict, Munir seeks not only to cement his grip on Pakistan but also to maintain the military’s dominant role in shaping national identity and foreign policy.
At the same time, Munir presents himself to the international community as a frontline warrior against terrorism. In a recent statement, General Sahir Shamshad, another top military official, ominously warned of a “new 9/11” if global cooperation falters—effectively issuing a threat disguised as a plea. Such messaging forms the bedrock of Pakistani military junta’s age-old tactic: sponsor terrorism covertly, then seek international funding and legitimacy to combat it.
ISI’s Deep and Dangerous Legacy
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency is no stranger to this duplicity. From its early use of Pashtun tribesmen by the Pakistani military in the 1947 Kashmir war to the CIA-funded jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the ISI has perfected the art of proxy warfare. Groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and the Taliban Network, commonly known as the Haqqani network have been armed, trained, and sheltered by Pakistan with strategic intent—to “bleed India by a thousand cuts,” to maintain leverage in Afghanistan, and to strengthen the military’s role in domestic politics.
Even after the 9/11 attacks and Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. in the so-called War on Terror, the ISI played a double game. It helped arrest a few al-Qaeda figures to appease Washington, all while continuing to support the Afghan Taliban and anti-India groups. This two-faced policy enabled Pakistan to receive billions in aid, while keeping its militant assets intact.
Recent examples are equally damning. The 2019 Pulwama attack, which killed 40 Indian paramilitary personnel, was traced back to JeM operatives trained in Pakistan. The 2025 Pahalgam massacre—where 26 civilians perished—also bore the signature of LeT, with training and support allegedly linked to Pakistani soil. The Pahalgam operation was reportedly personally overseen my General Shahab Aslam, Director General of the Special Operations Directorate of the ISI, upon the orders of the Army Chief Asim Munir.
Hosting ISIS While Marketing Counterterrorism
More troubling are reports that suggest elements of the ISI may be tolerating, or even hosting, ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) cells in Pakistan’s Baluchistan region. Local allegations from Mastung and Bajaur claim that ISIS-K operates with a level of impunity only possible through official complicity. While Pakistani authorities arrested a few ISIS-K operatives in high-profile raids, the broader picture suggests strategic ambiguity. By allowing a controlled threat to persist, the military can justify its authoritarian hold while portraying Pakistan as an indispensable counterterror partner.
The logic is chilling: sustain a manageable level of chaos, then offer services to manage it—for a price.
China’s Calculated Distance
China, Pakistan’s closest ally and economic patron through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), appears increasingly wary of Munir’s adventurism. Beijing has shown discomfort with the Pakistani narrative that blames Afghan instability for renewed conflict in Kashmir. Given its own investments in regional stability and fears of Uyghur militancy spilling over from Pakistan and Afghanistan, China is unlikely to back a strategy that fans the flames of jihadist conflict in the region.
Any misstep by Pakistan that drags China into unwanted confrontations could jeopardize Beijing’s broader Belt and Road Initiative. Behind the scenes, Beijing may well seek alignment with India to limit Munir’s capacity to destabilize South Asia.
While the Pakistani military top brass may park their illegitimate wealth in banks at Macau and Istanbul, thinking its a safe bet, but in such a high stakes game, things can change overnight.
India’s Asymmetric Response and the Baluchistan Pressure Valve
India, facing escalating militant incursions in Kashmir, is unlikely to remain passive. New Delhi’s doctrine of “proactive defence” and asymmetric retaliation means that pressure will mount in places like Baluchistan, where Pakistan’s military is already battling a persistent insurgency. The province has long resisted military occupation, and increased Indian support to Baloch separatists would only stretch the Pakistani Army thinner.
With multiple fronts—from TTP insurgency in the northwest to Baloch rebellion in the southwest—Pakistan’s military is overextended. Munir’s dangerous game may achieve short-term political dominance but risks catastrophic strategic overreach.
Military-Terrorism Complex: A Lucrative Enterprise
What emerges is not merely a security crisis but a business model. The Pakistani military-terrorism complex is a self-sustaining enterprise: support terror, provoke conflict, receive foreign aid, and consolidate domestic power. This model, pioneered by the ISI and perfected over decades, ensures that the military remains Pakistan’s most powerful and unaccountable institution.
Munir’s ambitions appear less about national security and more about regime longevity. His rhetoric of “defending Pakistan” masks a deeper strategy—one that thrives on orchestrated chaos.
Conclusion: The Wolf in Uniform
The world must now reckon with the fact that Pakistan’s military establishment, under
Asim Munir, is not a victim of terrorism but its enabler and beneficiary. By crying “wolf” while unleashing the pack, Munir has turned Pakistan into both battlefield and broker in the war on terror. The only potential counterweight lies in a quiet but strategic alignment between China and India to isolate and constrain Munir’s destabilizing hand.
Absent such intervention, South Asia may soon find itself dragged into yet another cycle of violence, not by the design of rogue actors, but by the calculated manoeuvring of a general who treats terror as both a tactic and a trade.
By exposing this deliberate duplicity, the international community must decide: will it continue funding Pakistan’s fire brigade while ignoring the arsonists in command?
